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The presumptuous task of presenting to this honorable convention
a European perspective on American philosophy of religion contains
two difficulties. One consists in the fulness of material, too much to be
treated in an hour. The second consists in the question: how does
"European" differ in meaning from "American"? The first difficulty
forces me to make a selection from the varieties of American philos-
ophies of religion, to which—also in my mind—theology belongs as a
principal part From the fulness of American philosophy of religion as
represented by outstanding theological and philosophical thinkers of
this country, I shall choose two types: the so-called theology of
imagination and process theology. In dealing with these two manifes-
tations we obtain at the same time a certain characterization of
European theology and philosophy. In contrast to the American
situation we have in Europe no real equivalent to either the theology
of imagination or process theology and until now neither has found a
great echo there, although both of them have important roots in
Europe, too. So you may take it as a sign of repentance for my brethren
when I direct my European perspective on American philosophy of
religion to the theologies of imagination and process.
There is, however, a further reason for this choice. From its origin
in New Testament eschatology and in view of the non-arrival of the
Parousia, Christianity has been occupied in different formulations
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with the problem of meaning and being throughout its whole history,
searching for ever new solutions to it. In contrast to other kinds of
theology and philosophy of religion the theology of imagination and
process philosophy and theology are basically struggling with this
problem, even when they are not always sure of its historical roots, or
when they transform its mythological form into a more or less secular
philosophical-speculative one. Their truth lies not so much in their
pretended solutions to the meaning-being problem as in their striving
with it, as is the case in the biblical understanding of history—and
throughout the whole history of Christianity.
That is the point I should like to make in my following confron-
tation with the theologies of imagination and process which is pre-
sented as a contribution not only to the American but to the European
philosophical-theological situation as well, and possibly also as a basis
for a real encounter with Far Eastern thinking. For this purpose I have
chosen two pairs of representatives of theologies of imagination and
process, and a third pair who combine them. For the first I have
chosen Ray L. Hart and Gordon Kaufman; for the second, John Cobb
and Schubert Ogden; and, for the last, David Tracy and Robert
Neville. I think that the outstanding position of these thinkers justifies
my restricted choice, and I hope that those who represent other kinds
of thought will profit from the critique, also, and that those whom I
critique will have some understanding for my bold undertaking to try
to understand them better than they understand themselves.
I
We shall begin our series with Ray Hart who, with his book,
Unfinished Man and the Imagination (1968), was to my knowledge
the first to introduce the concept of imagination to the American
theological scene, although not initially with great success because of
the difficulty of reading his book. In one remark he mentions Horace
Bushnell's book, Our Gospel a Gift to the Imagination (303). Other-
wise he comes to terms mainly with philosophers, with Aristotle and
with Kant's concept of the transcendental imagination, appeals to
historians of literature and philosophers of language, such as Dilthey
and Gadamer, and also makes use of Husserl's phenomenology. In an
appendix he deals with "pre-modern" cognates of his concept of
imagination in catholic and protestant scholasticism.
This concept gained special significance for Hart when he en-
deavored to use the kind of knowledge inherent in it to render
intelligible the concept of language- or word-event taken over by him
from the Bultmannian school. While Bultmann still spoke of the Word
of God as an "eschatological event" whose mythological form is to be
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interpreted existentially, that is, as an expression of a self-
understanding which finds its fulfillment of meaning in an alignment
with it, several disciples of Bultmann abandoned the questionable
concept "eschatalogical" because it appeared to them still too myth-
ological for speaking of the proclaimed Christ event as a language-
event which—mediated by language—is said to occur in faith. With-
out entering into a discussion of the ontological significance which
arose with this existential-ontological concept, that is, to what extent
it occurs in the divine and to what extent in the human realm, Hart
believes he can resolve the difficulty of the beingness of meaning
which arose in connection with the understanding of the Christ event
as language-event, and can make it more intelligible, by more accu-
rately describing "the mystery of the Word of God" for believers in
terms of imagination.
That he is concerned primarily with the question of meaning is
evident at the beginning of his book where he deplores the fact that
for modern man the Christian faith is no longer what it had been for so
long, namely, a "house of meaning". But he is convinced that it can
become so again if only the "Given" of theology—the event of the
Word of God—can again be made valid. For this purpose it is
necessary to distinguish between two kinds of language: a "first order
language" which—as he characterizes it—"preserves that body-heat
intimacy which obtains between apprehension and the reconfigura-
tion of linguistic debris which expresses it" and "as such is eventful",
and a "second order language" which "withdraws from the language-
event in order to place it in a larger frame, to connect it with
apprehensions embedded in the language of common currency, and
so to enhance its communicability in and to the public domain" (28).
In contrast with what is "immediately given" for theology, namely,
the "Word of God" as the "event of the Word of God in human
audition" and to the "paradigmatic events" which have "left the
stamp of their immediacy upon language" (44), theology belongs to
second order language; and the decisive question for theology may be
"whether its own linguistic debris can be used to erect a new house of
first order language; i.e. can be used to bring the subject-matter of
theology to language-event" (28). Otherwise than in a mere philoso-
phy of culture or even in a neo-orthodox "senkrecht von oben" (118)
this can only happen in the imagination as an "event-inverbalizing
language" (49).
It is understandable that Hart in this connection also mentions
Kant's use of the concept of imagination in his Critique of Pure
Reason (186, 236, 338f.). For just as Kant in his transcendental
imagination deals with the ontological character of perception, repre-
sentation and comprehension which are bound together in it into a
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unity, so also Hart vindicates the ontological character of his imagi-
nation not only—in contrast to Kant—in the sphere of phenomenality,
but for salvation facts of faith knowable as such. Hart reproaches Kant
not only for the lack of such an ontological knowledge, but also for
omitting the role of feeling and for failing to take into account the
historicity of the understanding. With his combination of imagination
and will—"Imagination is the intellectual organ of the will" (196)—he
already stands nearer to Fichte when in his own "anthropological
analysis" he replaces the Fichtean self-positing by an indefinable
"being situated and self-situating" (156n71) and sees in it the basis for
an "ontology of revelation" (109ff.).
There are experiences of meaning—the hindrances which resist
the will to meaning and the creative realization of meaning which
arises out it in the imagination—on the basis of which Hart believes
he can accede to pronouncements about being. When the conscious-
ness of reality is shaken because of its meaning and points beyond
itself, man can become ready to accept the gospel of God's salvation in
Christ as valid for himself and is thus able to understand his existence
in the world coram Deo.
Hart describes in detail this eventful becoming of salvation in self-
and world-understanding by recourse to a "hermeneutical spiral"
(61f.) and to Gadamer's "horizon-fusion" (58) by means of Husserlian
phenomenology and by analogy to the nature of the work of art.
Instead of a demonstration of the problematic of this existential-
ontological meaning-being-construction—which would not be very
fruitful—I should like to call attention to a passage in Hart's explica-
tion in which he speaks of a possibility—though not for himself-—of
overcoming this problematic. This takes place in connection with a
discussion of the concept of potentia obedientalis, that is, the predis-
position of man for divine grace (177£).
Hart correctly rejects the use of this concept for a intra-divine
occurrence, as in Ebeling, in favor of an event in human self-
understanding, in which the awareness of incompleteness forms the
point of contact of true human existence. He speaks here in the words
of Merleau-Ponty of an "antinomy of grace" as the "turning" point
"where the real self '. . . as the trembling of a unity exposed to
contingency and tirelessly recreating itself accedes to being consti-
tuted out of community with being—care-fully refunded for its good
out of its ownmost potency" (178). This corresponds to the formula-
tion of Martin Buber which he also mentions: "It depends on me" and
"I am given over for disposal" (177). One could here also recall
Jasper's "reception of one's self as a gift" (Sich-selber-geschenkt-
Bekommen).
Hart, however, mentions Jaspers only in a remark referring to a
Buri: American Philosophy of Religion 655
secondary source, for he regards this philosophical self-understanding
as insufficient, because "the Christ-event", "the subject-matter of
theology" which—in Hart's view—"is what [theology] and it alone
can say" does not get stated. Since for all his stress on the necessity for
imagination Hart is and remains a theologian of the word, he misses
the chance to see in the forms of a not-specifically Christian, more
universally human self-understanding which experiences itself in its
enactment as graced, the substance of the Christ-event and thus as a
symbol for the meaning-possibility of human existence attested and
experienced in these forms, and thus remains stuck with his imagina-
tion in the "word-prison" of an ambiguous "language-event".
What about the other representative of the theology of imagina-
tion, Gordon Kaufman? Did he take the opportunity to be liberated
from the "word-prison" in which Hart, no less than Bultmann, though
in different ways, is confined? Does Kaufmann take the chance
indicated of understanding Christian existence as symbolic of human
self-understanding, or with his concept of imagination does he be-
come entangled ever deeper in its snares?
Initially it could seem that the former is the case. In his first book
of essays, God the Problem (1972), there is a chapter that carries the
title, "God as Symbol", to which he assigns an important role in the
development of his thinking. While in his Systematic Theology (1968)
he reckoned with the objectivity of salvation-facts in a manner more
massive than does Hart, here he begins to understand these as
products of the symbolizing knowledge of faith, which is quite
different from Hart's persistent ontological talk about a "language-
event".
For this turn in the development of his theology Kaufman has
provided a comprehensive justification in his Essay on Theological
Method (1979). In the collected essays on essential topics of Christian
theology in his second book of essays, entitled, The Theological
Imagination (1981), he makes use of this method, as the subtitle
shows: "Constructing the Concept of God". While with Hart imagi-
nation, since it occurs as an "intellectual organ of the will", represents
the sphere in which the revelation of God occurs as "language-event",
with Kaufman it is man who in imagination constructs the concepts of
the religious tradition, so that they form for him "constructs of
imagination". Language-events are apparently quite different from
imaginative constructs, in that the former occur in imagination, while
the latter occur through imagination. In comparison with Hart's
Husserlian foundational theory, Kaufman's epistemological conceptu-
alizing is less demanding, as is evident in the fact that he speaks in an
undifferentiated way of "image/concepts" (1981: 14).
When considering imagination Kaufman also differs from Hart in
656 Journal of the American Academy of Religion
taking account not only of Christian theology and especially its
Christ-event; for he sees imagination as a longing for meaning and
orientation to meaning in all human culture and in the veneration of
meaning-giving powers in all religions (1981: 172ff.). This human
estimation makes possible for him a positive evaluation of the world of
religions, as is not the case in Hart's restriction of the imagination to
the Word of God given only for theology.
This enlarged way of regarding the history of culture and religion
becomes effective in Kaufman's understanding of revelation in two
ways: on the one hand, in a negative-critical manner, insofar as it
liberates him from the exclusivity claim of Christian mythology, and
on the other hand, in a positive manner insofar as this cultural and
historical view in whose context he discusses the biblical-Christian
history of salvation offers him an alternative for what is put into
question with this land of consideration, in that for him the histori-
cally conditioned biblical-Christian view is now replaced by the
religious and cultural evolution of mankind. As he appeals for this to
a salvation-historical conception of creation, Kaufman does not hesi-
tate to include nature in this universal conception of world and history
(1981: 209f.), and to attribute to man, whose completion he sees in the
image of Jesus Christ (1981: 114ff.), a special significance as the center
of the possible realization of salvation and meaning in the whole of
being.
Kaufman sees a difference between the two universal worldviews
only insofar as the mythological one is cultically more effective than
the more abstract-scientific and metaphysical one, but which for the
sake of its effectiveness has to be corrected by the latter. For all their
differences what is common to both formulations, according to Kauf-
man, is that they are constructions of the human longing for comple-
tion of meaning and that according to their mutual testimony this
completion of meaning consists in the humanization of man in active
love.
In the measure of their humanizing effect as in the truthfulness of
the religious or metaphysical grounding of this historical effectiveness
Kaufman believes to have found the criterion by which the truth of the
two constructions can be judged in their similarities and differences.
Under this perspective he submits these different patterns of an
unending critical examination and demands correspondingly also
their continuing reconstruction.
Since Kaufman is a theologian of the Church it-is quite obvious
that in this concern he is especially occupied with the God whom
Christians in "worship and service" trust as the meaning-ground of
human existence, while for him the corresponding abstract-metaphys-
ical worldviews form only its negative background insofar as he, with
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Kant, considers an empirical-rationalistic or speculative proof of God
as impossible. With Kaufman it is imagination which takes over the
role which Kant in this connection assigns to the practical reason for
which God is a postulate of morality. For the humanizing significance
of the idea of God Kaufman appeals not only to the history of culture
and religion in general, but in particular to his development in the
history of the biblical faith in God which peaks in the figure of Jesus
as the "model of true humanity". In the humanizing force of faith in
God which actualizes human nature he believes he can detect the
proof that it deals "with actuality, not merely fantasy", and that God as
meaning-ground of reality is simultaneously its ground of being.
"Faith", declares Kaufman, "lives from a belief in, a confidence that,
there is indeed a cosmic and vital movement. . . toward humaneness,
that our being conscious and purposive and thirsting for love and
freedom is no mere accident, but is undergirded somehow in the very
nature of things". For such a faith "God is the personifying symbol of
that cosmic activity which has created our humanity and continues to
press for its full realization" (1981: 49f.).
For this kind of thought in which Kaufman comes to this connec-
tion between the ground of being and meaning in God, it is significant
that he interrupts the critical discussion of the mythically transparent
picture of God just at the point where it comes into conflict with the
modern image of man and history (1981: 38f.) and that he takes it up
anew after having exhibited the meaning-giving moments in reality
contained therein, in order to conclude from them the existence of
God, and thus to establish the reality of God in its function as the
fulfilment of the human longing for meaning.
The imagination in which this occurs consists therefore not only
in the fact that this theologian—like the famous man from Muench-
hausen—thinks he can draw out of his own head—that is, from his
longing for meaning—the problematic of human meaning, but that the
place at which he could connect with it—in contrast to Muenchhau-
sen—he takes as a product of his imagination. Or, to illustrate his
situation with a less malicious, but by him seldom used image: On a
map he designates individual points of meaning by means of which he
thinks he is able to reach the goal of complete realization of meaning
(1972: 100; 1979: 28). But not only does this destination lie outside the
map, but with the intelligibility of these milestones he runs the risk
that the map which he inscribes renders only an imaginative land-
scape of longing and does not provide access "to the things as they
really are". If, despite this, he appeals to Feuerbach's judgment that
the transcendence of his concept of God excludes the illusion of a
mere satisfaction of needs (1981: 43), it cannot achieve this purpose
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for him, because it too represents such a construct of the imagination
arising out of the human need for meaning.
II
Obviously it is not sufficient—with Kaufman—to enlarge the
half-mythological Christ-event, to which Hart refers the imagination,
into a history of culture which peaks in Christianity. This the process
theologians seem to have known when they have attempted to
understand being as such as an occurrence of meaning and to include
Christology in it. Two of the most representative contemporary
process theologians have made this attempt, each in his own way:
John Cobb, in his most extensive publication, Christ in a Pluralistic
Age (1975) and in his systematic sketch, Process Theology, published
a year later with his pupil, David Griffin (1976); and Schubert Ogden,
in his The Point of Christology (1982) which appeared sixteen years
after his collection of essays, The Reality of God (1966). For Cobb, as
for Ogden, Christ represents the center of meaning of Whiteheadian-
Hartshornean process philosophy, with whose help they believe they
can solve the problems of traditional Christian salvation history, and
with their philosophical mentors they base their de-substantialized
metaphysics of meaning on experience. Both also confess that they
have passed through significant changes in their theological develop-
ment, in that for their originally rationalistic thinking the imaginal or
symbolic has gained decisive significance. But in contrast to the
theologians of imagination with whom they share the need for
meaning in experience, they do not orient it merely to history, or to a
single event; rather as they see it, the cosmic process as a whole
constitutes the event of meaning in which the man of faith partici-
pates, for it culminates in Christ and is pervaded by him.
John Cobb begins his Christology by taking on Andre Malraux's
art-historical thesis that in Western art the supra-earthly figure of the
redeemer is increasingly replaced by an earthly figure who finally
totally disappears in the plurality of profane styles. While Malraux
sees in this course of the history of art which he analyzes a proof for
the irresistible weakening of Christianity, Cobb believes he can draw
just the opposite conclusion from Malraux's view, insofar as he
believes he can see in the transformation of the divine figure of the
Christ into a human one and the subsequent richness of new creative
styles a typical example of that with which Christian faith deals, viz.
the incarnation of God in Christ and the "creative transformation"
which originated in this divine occurrence of salvation and became
effective not only in the history of humanity, but even in the entire
cosmos. This takes place in forms which are not limited to Christian-
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ity, but appear in other religions as well. Cobb summarizes his
positive interpretation of Malraux's thesis as follows: "The process
that relativized the Christ figure and then omitted it altogether was
itself the power represented by the Christ figure, namely, the Christ
himself (1975: 54).
As this sentence indicates, Cobb distinguishes between the
"Christ figure" and "Christ himself as the "power" represented in
the figure. From the art-historical discussion it is obvious that Cobb
also employs for the Christ-figure the concept of "image" as is also
customary in theology. But it is out of theology that there arises the
concept of "Logos" which he employs for "Christ himself and his
"creative power". While the image is a way of depicting what is meant
imaginally or even in abstract conceptuality, with "Christ himself or
the "Logos" we are dealing not with its depiction, but with its
"power"; i.e., as Cobb says, with an "ontological status" and—as we
can now say on the basis of the theologians of imagination previously
treated—not merely with an affair of the imagination. To be sure, the
latter emphasize that they deal not merely with products of the
imagination; rather, to such products are to be ascribed veridical value
provable in reality. It is in this sense that Cobb makes use of the
imagination (1975: 75), insofar as the significance of the "world of
images" has been disclosed to him, as he notes in the Foreword (1975:
14). But he regards an ontological foundation as indispensable for his
Logos metaphysics and is convinced that with the help of Process
Philosophy it is also possible.
In this sense he appeals to Whitehead, as he has done in all of his
publications, so now in all three parts of this book in which he
represents "Christ as the Logos", "Christ as Jesus" and "Christ as
Hope". While in this book this takes place only in the form of
individual characteristics and their application in aspects of Christol-
ogy previously discussed, in the book, Process Theology (1976), which
he published with David Griffin, the epistemological and metaphys-
ical foundation of his Christology and of his entire theology is set forth
in a systematic way. David Griffin, to whom was entrusted the first
four chapters, argues in a very apodictic way, in that he simply
presupposes the validity of Whiteheadian Process Philosophy. Rather
than hindering us, this fact gives us reason to register critical objec-
tions against some of the individual expositions of this thinking and its
application in theology.
Right at the beginning Griffin gives us reason for such a critique
when, with reference to Whitehead's identification of "actual occa-
sions" and "occasions of experience", he declares that Process Phi-
losophy understands human experience "as a high-level exemplifica-
tion of reality in general". For this "high-level" he refers to the
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reflexive experience characteristic of man—an experience which
however is grounded in a "pre-reflexive" universal processual event
independent of the former, but with which it is "merging" and therein
experiences its "metaphysical depth" (Cobb & Griffin, 13).
This mutual dependence of human experience and cosmic event
does not prevent him from speaking of this state of affairs by concep-
tually distinguishing between two kinds of process: a temporal pro-
cess consisting of a transition from one real occasion to another in such
a manner that the individual entities "perish immediately upon
coming into being"; and a process which occurs within these individ-
ual occasions as they become concrete or "grown together" as they
originate, but which now—in contrast to the former—are "timeless"
(Cobb & Griffin, 13f.).
Aside from the fact that this doctrine of process is an "hypothesis"
which cannot be proved scientifically but represents a speculative
extension of a process interpretation of human experience into some-
thing universal and cosmic, this speculation is burdened with diffi-
culties: What about the timelessness of this moment of process within
its temporality? Griffin explains that "concrescence" does not entail
"things which endure through a tiny bit of time unchanged", but with
things which need just "that bit of time to become" (Cobb & Griffin,
15) If, on the one hand, they need time in order to become, then they
are not timeless indeed. On the other hand, the "experience of the
'eternal Now' " is incompatible with the basic principle of thinking
"that all reality is fundamentally process". If "to be real" means to be
in process, then becoming concrete would not exactly be "reality".
That here a basic problem of Process Philosophy is at stake
becomes evident in Cobb's debate with the Buddhist doctrine of
"dependent co-origination" (Pratitya-samutpada) which dissolves all
occurrences into a flux which cancels every temporal thingness, but
loses on that account the personality of man, as Cobb rebukingly
speaks of it (1982).
This problematic character of Process Thought becomes even
more apparent in the characterization of "concrescence" as "enjoy-
ment" (Cobb & Griffin, 16ff.). "To be, to actualize oneself, to act upon
others, to share in a wider community, is to enjoy being an experienc-
ing subject". For Whitehead this enjoyment occurs universally. "Ev-
ery unit of process, whether at the level of human or of electronic
events, has enjoyment". The distinction consists only in its becoming
conscious, and this depends on the selective choice by which each
unit of process determines in a creative way what it accepts from the
past and transmits as an impetus to new experience, with the result
"that each occasion is a selective incarnation of the whole past
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universe" and "that our activities will make a difference throughout
the future" (Cobb & Griffin, 23).
What really takes place here: the single occasion or the universe?
Not one without the other, but rather only one with the other in a
selection and a particularity which belongs to the nature of the
process as an event that is simultaneously temporal and timeless. Or
with reference to what is human: human experience serves as a model
of the cosmic process which in turn actualizes itself most completely
in man's becoming aware of its universal character as a model.
Because this speculation deals, with a level of self-consciousness in
which there is a loss of the subject according to Pratitya-samutpada
and in a way which threatens process thinking, it occurs to us that
process thought is nothing but a construction by which human beings
in the world provide a meaning that is anchored in being as becoming.
Griffin confirms this wishful character of process thought when—in
view of our experience of the world as "a place of process, of change,
of becoming, of growth and decay"—he speaks of "our basic religious
drive" as "to be in harmony with the fully real" and of its fulfillment
not in a flight from the world, but in an "immersion in the process"
(Cobb & Griffin, 14).
While there are process philosophers who do not consider the
religious striving for harmony and understand it purely in an imma-
nent way, process theologians take it into account by including in the
universal process the idea of God as its origin and effect. In contra-
distinction both to classical substance metaphysics and the thought of
a "becoming God" they do that in the form of a "dipolar theism" in
that they distinguish between God's "primordial and consequent"
nature in a way dependent upon Whitehead and Hartshorne's partial
correction of the former's terminology (Cobb & Griffin, 43). The two
poles of the "creative-responding love" of God which as the "initial
aim" toward creative transformation and also its "eros" actively
permeate the processual event in each of its single acts and allows this
absolute activity to complete itself in a passivity which respects
human behavior—these two poles have as their metaphysical tran-
scendental equivalents the becoming and perishing which character-
ize the processual event Both of these poles are incarnate in the
Logos, i.e. in its incarnation in Christ.
That is the point where Cobb in both of the books mentioned
introduces his Logos Christology and from which he interprets the
person of the historical Jesus as well as trinitarian-Christological
dogma and from which there unfold eschatology and the doctrine of
the Church—and from which finally he speaks of special problems
like ecology, relations with other religions, especially Buddhism,
feminist theology, etc.
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As a whole, this process theology, which is carried through with
great skill, although fraught with questionable vagueness, represents
an interesting counterpart to the theology of imagination. Both are
concerned with establishing the meaning of human existence. Their
difference lies in the fact that the latter seeks with the help of the
imagination to find it in the Christ event, or in its expansion into the
history of culture or religious imagination; whereas process theology
thinks it can anchor both moments in a speculative-cosmic metaphys-
ical understanding of being as becoming. The problematic character
of both of these undertakings consists precisely in their attempt to
establish meaning in terms of an optimism about the meaningfulness
of being which is not fully sensitive to the problematic of meaning.
In a way matched by few other process theologians, Schubert
Ogden has been engaged in an extension and validation of the
metaphysics of the dipolar God which is characteristic of this kind of
theology. But in this circle he is the one who—as he confesses in his
book on Christology—has become "increasingly sceptical" about this
undertaking (1982: 135). However promising this may sound, the
consequences which he has drawn out of this change of attitude about
metaphysics which sounds much like a conversion are even less
convincing. For the "boundless love of God", for which he has been
concerned from the beginning, he no longer wishes to refer to its
embodiment in the historical Jesus and its metaphysical exemplifica-
tion in dipolar process metaphysics, but primarily to the apostolic
witness of the experience of God's love associated in the tradition
with this figure and which—as he claims—gives us the victory (1982:
126E).
In connection with our question about the possibility of founding
the meaning of human existence we have to deal neither with the
methodology which Ogden uses in the interpretation of the
eschatological witness of faith nor with its results; rather we note that
in both respects he overcomes neither the problem of faith andlristory
unsolved in the theology of Ritschl and his school nor Martin Kaeh-
ler's theology of needs. What interests us here is the treatment he
devotes to the problem of metaphysics. To that we must say that,
contrary to his own assumptions (1982: 46f.), he does not arrive at a
convincing solution of the problem of meaning and being. What he
finds objectionable in classical Thomism as well as in the "neo-
classical metaphysics" of process theology is the "categorial" charac-
ter of their speculation about analogy which he would like to replace
with a "literally symbolic one" which can be confirmed in praxis
(1982: 133f.).
For this purpose he retains as before Hartshorne's dipolar con-
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ception of God and is not able to make clear the difference between
the "categorial" analogy-speculation which he rejects and the non-
analogical "symbolic", "transcendental" metaphysics which he pos-
tulates in its place (1982: 143). For even he engages in analogy-
speculation when he seeks to reinstate his old fundamental sentence
that the quest for the final meaning of our human existence presup-
poses a "basic faith in the worth of life" (1982: 30).
The difference between his position and that of classical meta-
physics, which actually is not capable of giving an account of the
Christ-event, consists in the fact that he thinks he can explain
Hartshorne's dipolar view of God through this distinction between—
as he says—the "symbolic rather than literal metaphysical assertion"
that God "in himself "as ultimate reality is boundless love" (1982:
144), and the fact that his love "for us" which has the effect of enabling
us to deal in love with all our fellow-creatures, is "expressible only in
non-cognitive religious language". For the former assertion he refers
to the apostolic testimony about experience in Christ. In the latter
he expands this view of experience by a reference to the nature of
our own experience of love, which "implies not only acting on the
other, but also, and just as surely, being acted on by the other" (1982:
145).
In view of this distinction we have to ask: How can Ogden say of
the former assertion that it is "not literally metaphysical" although it
speaks of what God is "in himself, and how is it possible that such a
differentiated experience as he has in mind can be a "non-cognitivist"
one? It is not doubted that the representatives of the apostolic witness
are not interested in metaphysics, and certainly the praxis of love is
something other than a theory of love. But this state of affairs does not
become clear in the terminology used by Ogden, but is rather deposed
from the intention he has in mind. According to their true intention
symbols are the unavoidable as well as necessary "literal" objectifi-
cations of an existential self-understanding which experiences itself
as related to Transcendence in community (Cf. Buri, 1984).
When Ogden quotes the Parable of the Last Judgment as the
conclusion of his Christology and remarks that therein "in no way a
christological, or even theological criterion" is brought out (1982:
167), and that we are obliged "not only to talk about the point of
Christology but also to make it" (1982: 168), we are justified in seeing
this as a self-problematization of his theology as well as a hint as to
how one can understand him better than he understands himself,
namely, that for existence no abolition of risk is possible, but that we
can experience ourselves as blessed only in risking ourselves—in
theory and in practice.
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III
Now that we have demonstrated the nature and problematic of the
theologies of imagination and process by means of two very different
pairs of theologians, we still have to take into account two other
theologians who attempt—apparently on the basis of their insight into
the insufficiency of both of these kinds of theology—through combin-
ing them to overcome their shortcomings and to validate their ele-
ments of truth. As already indicated, they are David Tracy and Robert
Neville.
Now that Ogden has so sharply criticized the use of analogy in the
classical metaphysics of the churchly tradition (1982), David Tracy
would not evaluate the theology of Ogden in as positive a manner as
he did in an extended treatment of Process Theology in his book,
Blessed Rage for Order (1975) and in a longer remark in The
Analogical Imagination (1981) where he declares with more reserve:
My own option is basically for the process theology tradi-
tion but not, I hope, without a more adequate treatment of some
of the subtleties and the complexities of the Thomist (espe-
cially transcendental Thomist) position than the latter was
accorded in BRO. I continue to believe (as in BRO) that process
theologies need to develop and be corrected by the symbolic
(and, therefore, radical mystery) side of the tradition and need,
as well, a profounder sense of the negative in their develop-
ments of analogical language. I remain convinced, however, of
the greater basic adequacy of the process tradition for interpret-
ing the central Christian understanding that 'God is Love' and
for resonating to a contemporary sense of change, process and
internal relationships (see BRO, pp. 187-204). Still, the sym-
bolic, the negative and the sense of radical mystery (incompre-
hensibility, hidden and revealed God, etc.) need more dialec-
tical incorporation into a process systematic theological
understanding of God (1981: 439-40).
Despite his denial of analogy, it may be that Ogden who has more
recently (1982) advocated a "literal symbolic" conception of meta-
physical assertions now complies at least intentionally to some degree
with the demand Tracy brings forward vis-a-vis Ogden's earlier
position. A closer juxtaposition between them is evident also in the
fact that Ogden now advocates the establishing of faith in Jesus Christ
on the authority of the apostolic witness (1982: 245)—a point posi-
tively stressed by Tracy with respect to Ogden's former position—in a
more extensive and emphatic manner.
Despite Tracy's sympathy for Process Philosophy and Ogden's
recourse to the "apostolic witness" as a source and norm of faith
alongside one's own experience, there remain as before significant
differences between the two theologians. Not only does Ogden avoid
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the concept of imagination which has won thematic significance for
Tracy in his second book, but the difference between them noted by
Tracy that he continues to ascribe "truth value" to "poetic language"
over against Ogden's predilection for "non-poetic," "abstract" lan-
guage (1981: 86) still persists, insofar as Ogden remains, as before, in
the service of abstract metaphysical language and shows no interest in
the use of literature and art which play a major role in Tracy's thought.
It is true, as Tracy indicated, that Whitehead's "subjective principle",
in consequence of which man serves as a model of process cosmology,
corresponds to the transcendentalism of Rahner's metaphysics—as
represented by Tracy—according to which the sought-for metaphysi-
cal point of relation is already contained in the question, insofar as in
both methods an individual moment of meaning is confidently ex-
tended to the meaningfulness of the whole of being (1981: 412ff.). But
even in this special kind of "natural theology" we must not overlook
the important difference that with Ogden, as is generally the case in
Process Philosophy, this metaphysics is represented in a rational way
and on the basis of a directly established evolution, while Tracy,
following the classical catholic pattern, appeals to analogy as a
relation of "similarity in dissimilarity". Strange to say, he does not
mention the dogmatized formula of analogia entis as a greater dissim-
ilarity in similarity, but rather prefers to speak of a "soft" metaphysics
which he advocates, with Rahner, as opposed to the "hard" classical
one (1981: 161).
Wherein then consists the "analogical imagination" from whose
formulation as the title of Tracy's second major work we learned the
two points by which the latter distinguished himself from Ogden's
Process Philosophy? We have already begun to speak of the nature of
analogy in the comparison between the Whiteheadian "subjective
principle" and the transcendental metaphysics of recent catholic
theology, insofar as it determines the relation of immanence and
transcendence, or of transcendence in immanence, epistemologically
and ontologically. Between these two spheres a being-ful analogy
exists, insofar as being is so ordered that from the perspective of
human immanence a logical conclusion is possible, not only for being
as a whole but also for its transcendent ground. According to the
transcendental conception this immanence of transcendence is al-
ready present in the epistemological act of transcending and, as such,
forms the natural presupposition for supernatural revelation, which on
its side functions as the basis of the order of being and so makes
possible that epistemological transcending, as Tracy characterized it
in the title of his first book (1975).
In his book on analogy-speculation he introduces as his method-
ology of knowledge the concept of imagination which had been
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occasionally mentioned in his first book (1975:78), and explains it in
detail. Referring to the "famous word" of Aristotle, "to spot the similar
in the dissimilar is the mark of poetic genius" (1981:410), Tracy
combines analogy with imagination as "a reflection upon the self s
primordial experience of its similarity-in-difference to the event"
(1981: 410). Between both of them exists a dialectical relationship
insofar that "the same power—at once participatory in the originating
sense of wonder, trust, disclosure and concealment by the whole, and
positively distancing itself from that event by its own self-constituting
demands of critical reflection—releases the analogical imagination of
the systematic theologians to note the profound similarities-in-
difference in all reality" (1981: 410).
As is evident from this quotation and its context, the event that is
here at stake is a "religious event", or more precisely, the "Christ-
event" and its efficacy as "all pervasive grace". But Tracy's intention
is to see in this analogical imagination not merely an affair of theology;
rather he wants to exemplify its theological application to the spheres
of literature and art in their classical formulations, which for their
understanding require the same methods as the Bible and the Chris-
tian tradition and teaching on the reality of God in general and
salvation in Christ in particular. While earlier (1975) he viewed the
revelation of transcendence in a dialectic of the limit of thinking as a
self-manfestation of that which limits ("limit to" = "limit of), later
(1981) he unfolded the same dialectic in relation to the christological
salvation-event and its "not yet and already"^in one case as the
shattering of conceptual-objective knowing which has to be taken into
account in the use of a symbol, and in the other case—in view of the
problematic of the fundamental presupposition of the Christian
faith—as the claim that the promised salvation in Christ has already
occurred, but—in view of the non-arrival of the Parousia—has always
to occur anew (1981: 252ff.).
In view of this irritating state of affairs Tracy speaks repeatedly of
the "dangerous, provocative, subversive" memory of Jesus of Naza-
reth (1981: 424, passim). On the one hand he sees therein a warning
against every false desire for harmony as it belongs to religiosity
(1981: 154ff). On the other hand he points to the whole of the
Christian tradition and its classic formulations preserved in the
Church as an indispensable help (1981: 164, 235ff). Trust in these
instances is for him included in trust in God's love revealed—albeit in
a dialectical manner—in Christ, which—in accord with the nature of
this faith—is to be extended through the analogical imagination to the
whole of "God, man and world" in a way which justifies in an
unending dialectic a pluralism of interpretations and religious bodies
(1981: 447).
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That is the manner in which Tracy would correct the Process
Theology of his friend Ogden through analogical imagination. In
accord with this intention he restricts the attempt by process theology
to ground cosmologically the meaning of human existence in the
meaning of being as a whole to an interpretation of meaning in the
realm of social history effected on the basis of the Christian faith. If
Ogden would see the relation between his experience of God's love
witnessed in the apostolic faith and his own personal love-faith
experience in a less rationalistic and metaphysical and more poetic,
imaginative way, he could probably follow Tracy on his way to Rome,
although this way would still need some analogical imagination even
for Tracy. But I fear, or hope, that for both theologians the "dangerous
memory of Jesus" would be a blessed obstacle on the way, since—as
Tracy once concedes and Ogden takes quite seriously—to it belongs
the fact of the non-arrival of the Parousia (1981: 265f.) as the great
paradigm of the foundering of all universal constructions of mean-
ing—a shattering that could become the symbol of true realization of
meaning, if it is not eliminated, historically by Tracy, psychologically
by Ogden, to their detriment
Robert Neville has chosen another path on which he did not stop
in the Christian West, but on which his Daimon guided him to the Tao
of the Far East.
That and how we conclude the series of our selected representa-
tives of American theology and philosophy of religion with Robert
Neville results from the fact that he is, on the one hand, a keen-sighted
critic of the theologies of imagination and process, and on the other,
that as an equally great systematic thinker, he tries in one system to
bring together the concerns and results of the two kinds of theology
corrected by him, trusting that he is able to do justice to Christian faith
in creation and redemption as well as to the Tao of Far Eastern
thinking in a completion that unites the two.
In contrast to the ontological problematic of Hart's concept of
event and Kaufman's use of imagination as pragmatic satisfaction of
need, Neville univocally defines the nature of imagination as valua-
tion bound up with norms in the context of the experience of thinking.
Against their claim to overcome the subject-object split of conscious-
ness, he reproaches the representatives of Process Philosophy and
Theology for still treating process as an object and only in such a way
that the subject of thinking as well as the subjectivity of God become
problematic, insofar as one does not know who is doing the thinking,
the process-event or the thinking subject, and insofar as the identity or
non-identity of God with this process, or with its thinker, does not
become clear (Cf. especially: 1980). In his major, unfinished work
(1981a), he contends—against the aprioristic-rationalistic character of
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Kant's transcendental imagination—that it does not in his judgment
take valuing feeling into account and is not able to explain the source
of the forms of representation and the concepts of reason (1981a:
149ff.). He will hold fast to the "Naturalism" of Process Thought,
insofar as he understands it to be far more differentiated than do its
other representatives (1981a: 68ff).
Neville's reconstruction of thinking represents an extremely dif-
ferentiated network of several interrelated kinds of thinking which—
each in its own way—appear in the special realms of the spirit and of
culture and in which they validate their criteria. Imagination forms for
Neville the starting-point and final basis of thinking. It consists in a
valuing selection of individual components out of the manifoldness of
experience, and the norm consists in their adaptability into the totality
of a harmony of "beauty". Religion is the pre-eminent field of
appearance of this imagination. But thinking does not exhaust itself in
imagination, for it involves a further structural element—interpreta-
tion—in which the contents of thought are tested for their "truth"—a
criterion which is important in the field of "politics", but which plays
no role in imagination itself. Furthermore, thinking demands theory
which intends "formal unity" and results in "knowledge". This series
concludes with the responsibility of the valuing one for his valuation
in the "philosophical life" as "obligation to goodness" (1981a: 27ff).
Despite their differences these four aspects are not to be separated,
but in fact entail each other, in that on the one side the valuing
imagination continues in the succeeding ones as they presuppose it,
and on the other side because responsibility is actualized in those
which precede it.
Of this complex system of an "Axiology of Thinking" Neville has
so far produced only the first part, viz. the imagination, and only
indicated the pertinent parts which are to follow, so that it is not
possible for us to make a conclusive judgment about his pretentious
undertaking. Nevertheless, systematic difficulties are evident in what
has appeared already, in that in the preview of the whole work
"beauty" as a criterion is ascribed to the synthetic function of the
imagination (1981a: 18), whereas in the exposition of the imagination
in the present volume, in which interpretation forms an aspect of
imagination, it is assigned to the sphere of "perception" in the
"interpretation" (1981a: 177f.).
Another more important difficulty with which Neville is obviously
struggling, is evident in the different location of imagination in the
series of the different structures of thinking. While in his main work
he places imagination at the beginning and allows thinking to begin
with imagination (1981a: 135), in the recent sequel to it (1982: 236), it
stands only in the third place, after interpretation and theory. Of
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course he does not fail to emphasize immediately that this "third
dimension"—the imagination—is "in fact the one on which the others
rest". But why doesn't he admit at the beginning, as he does in his
basic theses, that thinking is grounded in "valuation", which first
appears in imagination (1981a: x, 146f), since this corresponds to the
detailed analysis in this work and also agrees with what he set forth
briefly in his later work (1982)? These final concluding remarks in the
latter work are so instructive that a long citation is here in order:
I use the word imagination here roughly as Kant did—to
mean the basic activities of synthesis by which various causal
impingements of the environment are transformed into the stuff
of experience. The goal of the imagination is engagement
Images, the basic forms of imagination, are the terms in which
experience is taken up; they constitute the basic orders of the
world. In fact, they constitute the world in a crucial sense.
Experience orders what otherwise would be merely mechani-
cal pushes into a world with spatial and temporal dimensions,
values and interests, vectors of forces and possibilities with
various degrees of attractiveness. The function of imagination
is to supply this order so that the other dimensions of thinking
have structure and horizons in which to exist This is not to say
that the world is a solipsistic, subjective construct or that there
is no external world; rather it is to say that the way human
beings experience external elements is to "worldize" them.
Any consideration of the truth of a particular assertion about
what is real is based on, and therefore relative to, its own
imagery, its own fundamental structure (1982: 236f).
Anyone who is at least to some extent familiar with "the transcen-
dental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding", which as is
well known belongs to the most difficult and problematic sections of
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, will doubtless recognize the differ-
ences between Neville's and Kant's understanding of imagination
which the former—in a way different from this summary—demon-
strates in various places in (1981a: Cf. index, p. 342). Neville replaces
Kant's apriori forms of intuition and understanding with the pictorial
world of imagination. Although he also adds to these both "interpre-
tation" and "theory", he exempts himself from the difficulties associ-
ated with the apriority of these forms, but at the same time through
this connection of interpretation and theory with the imagination he
ascribes to the latter die capacity for knowing "external reality" which
Kant's restriction to its phenomenality does not permit.
Whereas proper theologians of imagination, with their images, do
not escape the suspicion of an illusory wishful thinking, Neville can
refer for his imaginal world to Process Philosophy in which these form
a constituent part of reality conceived as process, but only so at the
expense of the "unity of self-consciousness" which, according to Kant,
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accompanies all acts of thinking and which finally grounds their
character as reality. The loss of the self in exchange for a "self-less",
universal occurrence which is ultimately identical with some kind of
impersonal deity is the price Neville has to pay for his overcoming of
Kant through his processual theology of imagination, in which God
becomes for him the "creativity" of the Holy Spirit (1981b). This
problematic becomes most apparent in Neville's positive advance into
the Far Eastern idea of the Tao, in which the dualism represented by
Hart and Kaufman, and inherent in Kant as well, is replaced by a
monism of being, and through a radically understood Pratitya-
samutpada even the last vestige of objectivity in Whitehead's "con-
crescence" is overcome. He believes he can succeed in his attempt to
secure the Daimon of theory might emerge. This could happen,
however, not in a universal speculation about imagination or process,
but only in a Christological theology of a self-understanding which
experiences itself as related to its special Transcendence and which
forms the basis of a community with a corresponding structure.
IV
To present such a theology here, even in its bare essentials, would
exceed the framework of what could be expected of me as my task and
far exceed the time we have at our disposal. As an indication of the
epistemological and metaphysical structures of such a theology, I
shall be content to close with some concise principles for appropri-
ately treating the problem of meaning and being which could help a
bit to clarify and correct the six types of contemporary American
theology already discussed, so that they not only remain typically
American, but may become even a bit more Christian.
For this aim we sum up the critical viewpoints used in the
preceding in the following manner.
The two terms of the problem of meaning and being, namely,
meaning and being, can and must be conceived at the same time as
different as well as inseparable:
Meaning, first, as an (as much as possible) univocal designation of
something meant in logical conceptuality, which in view of what is
meant—constitutes an abstraction and always remains relative. This
relativity becomes even stronger when what is at stake is not an (as
much as possible) objective explaining, but an interpreting of what is
meant in its subsequent enactment in a subjective valuing which,
together with explaining, belongs to understanding.
This leads us, in the second place, to meaning as value which is
characterized by the fact that its being is preferred to its non-being.
This concept of value is only possible where the concept of meaning
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is understood as a striving for logical univocity and gives to the
formality of the latter its being-ful content Over against what is
unknown even what is only relatively known represents a value, even
though it is not possible on the basis of the first mentioned concept of
meaning to establish an absolute order of value.
The connection between these two concepts of meaning—mean-
ing as designation and meaning as value—leads necessarily to a
corresponding differentiation in the concept of being:
First, we are dealing in the first instance in this meaning-thinking
with a being rather than with the being which must for conceptual
thinking remain a void.
Second, we can conceive being neither as the sum of all beings in
the sense of the first concept of meaning—because in it we are always
dealing only with a part of the totality of being—nor can we "mean"
it as the foundation of beings without making it into a being.
While the being that is available to us only in this particularity
remains a riddle both in itself and in relation to those of us who
interrogate the meaning of our existence, in our self-understanding—
which represents a void for our conceptualizing as well as for being,
but nevertheless remains the root of our consciousness of being—we
experience the mystery of being in a special way, namely, as the
origin of what'is for us the problematic of meaning and being. For
man, because of the problem of meaning, being becomes a crisis and
therein exhibits itself in its transcendence which can only be spoken
of in symbols as indispensable objectifications of what is not objectifi-
able.
Philosophical and religious worldviews are expressions of this
crisis as well as questionable attempts to overcome it. In theology,
corresponding to these different philosophical connections or antith-
eses of meaning as designations of what is meant and meaning as
value is the distinction or relationship between reason and faith. The
problematic of the concept of being in the ontological difference is
reflected in the distinction between God as Creator and the creatureli-
ness of his creation, on the one hand, and on the other, between God
as Redeemer and his salvation history in the salvific work of his Son—
both united in the open mystery of the Trinity.
The problem of language is evident in philosophy as well as
theology in the possibilities of mystical silence and the existential
interpretation of objectifying mythology and speculation as the basis
of a dialogue with other religions, and of a positive, critical attitude
toward their redeemer figures. While the silence grows out of the
awareness of the mystery of being and its riddle of meaning, the
existential interpretation has the function of endowing that awareness
with speech as a special revelation of the mystery of being by making
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possible particular realizations of meaning as a grace of being. It is the
destiny of religions to inform one another in theory and practice of
such real possibilities of individually restricted experiences of solu-
tions of the problem of meaning and being and thereby to understand
themselves and one another more deeply.
In Christianity the problem of meaning and being takes a special
form, because in its historical origin it arose out of the non-fulfillment
of the eschatological, being-ful expectation of meaning, or out of its
transformation in the dififerent churches based on this hope and their
means of salvation. Christianity will have to do with the truth in
respect to itself as well as in contrast to other conceptions of salvation
only to the extent that it absolutizes none of the alleged solutions to
the problematic of its origin which have arisen in the course of history,
but rather sees in them only housings which have repeatedly to be
dismantled in order to see itself constantly confronted anew with the
problem of meaning and being, as we have experienced it in a partial
way in our debate with six American theologians. Even in their
self-conscious failures I know myself to be with them on the way to a
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